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Abstract
The new perspectives on Bayesian model criticisms presented in
Ratmann et al. (2009) are challenging standard approaches to Bayesian
model choice. We discuss here some issues arising from the approach,
including prior influence, model assessment and criticism, and the
meaning of error.
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In Ratmann et al. (2009), the perception of the approximation error in
the ABC algorithm (Pritchard et al., 1999, Beaumont et al., 2002, Marjoram
et al., 2003) is radically modified, moving from a computational parameter
that is calibrated by the user when balancing precision and computing time
into a genuine parameter  about which inferences can be made in the same
manner as for the original parameter θ. As stressed in Section S2 of Ratmann
et al. (2009), this is indeed a change of perception rather than a modifica-
tion of the ABC method in that the target in θ remains the same. (This
should not be construed as a criticism in that the unification of most ABC
representations proposed in Section 2 is immensely valuable.) Although the
derivation of the distribution ξx0,θ() is somewhat convoluted in Section S1,
we note here that it is simply the distribution of the error ρ(S(x),S(x0))
when x ∼ f(x|θ), i.e. a projection of f(x|θ) in probabilistic terms.
Example—For a Poisson x0 ∼ P(θ) model, a natural divergence is the
difference  = x− x0 which is distributed as a translated Poisson P(θ)− x0
when conditional on x0 and which is marginaly distributed as the difference
of two iid P(θ) variables. Since  thus is an integer valued variable, the
supplementary prior pi should reflect this feature. A natural solution is
pi(k) ∝ 1/(1 + k2) ,
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since the series
∑
k 1/k
2 is converging, even though using a proper prior pi
does not appear to be a necessary condition in Ratmann et al. (2009). J
The change of perception in Ratmann et al. (2009) is based on the un-
derlying assumption that the data is informative about the error term ,
which is not necessarily the case, as shown by the previous and following
examples.
Example—For a location family, x0 ∼ f(x− θ), if we take  = x− x0, the
posterior distribution of  is
pi(|x0) ∝
∫
f(+ x0 − θ)piθ(θ)pi() dθ pi()
and therefore a mostly flat prior piθ(θ) with a large support produces a
posterior pi(|x0) identical to pi() for most values of x0. Conversely, a
highly concentrated prior pi() hardly modifies the posterior pi(θ|x0). J
Example—For the binomial model x0 ∼ B(n, θ), assuming a uniform prior
θ ∼ U(0, 1), we can consider  = x − x0, in which case  is supported on
{−n, . . . , n}. If we use a uniform prior on  as well,
pi(|x0) ∝
(
n
+ x0
)∫
θ+x0(1− θ)n−−x0 dθ I{−n,...,n}()
∝
(
n
+ x0
)
(+ x0)!(n− − x0)!
(n+ 1)!
I{−n,...,n}()
= 1
/
(1 + 2n) I{−n,...,n}()
and therefore the (Bayesian) model brings no information about . J
Obviously, this example is not directly incriminating against the method
of Ratmann et al. (2009), in that it only considers a single statistic, instead
of several as in Ratmann et al. (2009) (which distinguishes this paper from
the remainder of the literature, where  is a single number).
1 Bayesian model assessment
The paper chooses to assess the validity of the model based on the marginal
likelihood m(x) instead of the predictive p(x|x0). While this has the advan-
tage of “using the data once”, it suffers from a strong impact of the prior
modelling and of not conditioning on the observed data x0. A more appro-
priate (if still ad-hoc) procedure is to relate the observed statistics S(x0)
with statistics simulated from p(x|x0), as in, e.g., Verdinelli and Wasser-
man (1998). It may be argued that checking the prior adequacy is a good
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thing, but having no way to distinguish between prior and sampling model
inadequacy is a difficulty, as seen in the Poisson example.
Example—For the location family, x0 ∼ f(x − θ), the joint posterior dis-
tribution of (θ, ) is
f(+ x0 − θ)pi(θ)pi() ,
and therefore the difference ( − θ) is not identifiable from the data, solely
from the prior(s). J
Note that, from an ABC perspective, using p(x|x0) instead of m(x) does
not imply a considerable increase in computing time. However, computing
the Bayes factor (and therefore the evidence) using the acceptance rate of
the ABC algorithm is even faster. Moreover, it provides a different answer.
Example—For the Poisson P(θ) model, if we take as an example an expo-
nential E(1) prior piθ, the evidence associated with the model is∫
piθ(θ)f(x0|θ)dθ =
∫
θx0e−2θ
x0!
dθ = 2−x0−1 ,
while the quantitative assessment of Ratmann et al. (2009) is
∞∑
k=−x0
pi(k|x0)I {pi(k|x0) ≤ pi(0|x0)} , (1)
with
pi(|x0) ∝
∫
θ+x0e−2θ
(+ x0)!(1 + 2)
dθ =
2−−x0−1
(1 + 2)
.
The numerical comparison of both functions of x0 in Figure 1 shows a much
slower decrease in x0 for the p-value (1) than for the evidence, not to mention
a frankly puzzling non-monotonicity of the p-value. J
2 Implications of model criticism
While the approach by Ratmann et al. (2009) provides an informal assess-
ment that can be derived in an ABC setting, the Bayesian foundations of
the method may be questioned. The core of the Bayesian approach is to in-
corporate all aspects of uncertainty and all aspects of decision consequences
into a single inferential machine that provides the “optimal” solution. In the
current case, while the consequences of rejecting the current model are not
discussed, they would most likely include the construction of another model.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the decreasing rates of the evidence (blue) and of
the p-value (black) derived from Ratmann et al. (2009) for a Poisson model.
In the first graph in the paper, several models are contrasted and this leads
us to wonder about the gain compared with using the Bayes factor, which
can be directly derived from the ABC simulation as well since the (accepted
or rejected) proposed values are simulated from pi(θ)f(x|θ).
Example—For the Poisson x0 ∼ P(θ) model, running ABC with no ap-
proximation (since this is a finite setting) produces an exact evaluation of
the evidence. J
We also note that the non-parametric evaluation at the basis of the ABCµ
algorithm of Ratmann et al. (2009) can equally be used for approximating
the true marginal density m(x). The smooth version of ABCµ presented
in Section S1.5, eqn. [S8], is however far from being a density estimate of
ξx0,θ() since it based on a single realisation from f(x|θ). It should rather be
construed as a (further) smoothed version of its smooth ABC counterpart
and this suggests integreting over h as well. Unless some group structure
can be exploited to avoid the repetition of simulations xb = xb(θ), the non-
parametric estimator [S9] cannot be used as a practical device because either
B is small, in which case the non-parametric approximation is poor, or B
is large, in which case producing the xb’s for every value of θ is too time-
consuming. Obviously, using moderate B is always feasible from a compu-
tational point of view and it can also be argued that the approximation of
fρ(θ, |x0) by fˆρ(θ, |x0) is not of major interest, since the former is only an
approximation to the true target. (In a vaguely connected way, the rejection
sampler of Subsection S1.8 does seem an approximation to exact rejection-
sampling, in that the choice of the upper bound C = maxi mink ξˆk(ik,xi)
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over the samples simulated in Step 1 of the algorithm does not produce a
true upper bound.)
3 On the meaning of the error
The error term  is defined as part of the model, based on the marginal,
with the additional input of a prior distribution pi(). Since Ratmann et al.
(2009) analyse this error based on the product of two densities, ξx0,θ()pi(),
this product is not properly defined from a probabilistic point of view. The
authors choose to call ξx0,θ() a “likelihood” by a fiducial argument, but
this is (strictly speaking) not [proportional to] a density in x0. Obviously,
simulating from the density that is proportional to ξx0,θ()pi()pi(θ) is entirely
possible as long as this function integrates in (θ, ) against the dominating
measure, but it suffers from an undefined probabilistic background in that,
for instance, it is not invariant under reparameterisation in : changing  to ε
introduces the squared Jacobian |d/dε|2 in the “density”. We acknowledge
that most ABC strategies can be seen as using a formal “prior+likelihood”
representation of the distribution of , since
piABC(θ) =
∫
pi()ξ(|x0, θ) d pi(θ) ,
but this formal perspective does not turn  into a “true” parameter and
pi into its prior. For instance, non parametric pi’s may be based on the
observations or on additional simulations.
The denomination of “likelihood” is thus debatable in that ξx0,θ()pi()pi(θ)
cannot always be turned into a density on x0 (or even on a statistic S(x0)).
Example—For the Poisson x0 ∼ P(θ) model, ξx0,θ() is the translated
Poisson distribution P(θ) − , truncated to positive values. While this is
indeed a distribution on x0, conditional on (θ, ), it cannot be used as the
original Poisson distribution, because of the unidentifiability of . J
We also think that comparing models via the (“posterior”) distributions
of the errors  does not provide a coherent setup in that this approach does
not incorporate the model complexity penalisation that is at the heart of
the Bayesian model comparison tools like the Bayes factor. First, a more
complex (e.g., with more parameters) model will most likely have a more
dispersed distribution on . Second, returning to the first argument of that
nore, the choice of the prior pi() (and of the error  itself) is model dependent
(as stressed in the paper via the notation pi(,M)) and the comparison thus
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reflects possibly mostly the prior modelling instead of the data assessment,
as shown, again, by the location parameter example. Using the same band
of rejection for all models as in Figure 1 of Ratmann et al. (2009) thus does
not seem possible nor recommendable on a general basis.
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